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Abstract
A consensus has formed in the welfare reform literature suggesting that welfare eligible
households (WEH) “bank” benefits in the presence of time limits, either by delaying
enrollment in welfare or exiting well before the time limit is reached. In this study, we use
the standard labor-leisure lifetime utility to analyze the behavioral effects of imposing time
limits on welfare use. Our approach is different from our predecessors (which model welfare
participation) in that we model delayed enrollment in and early exit from welfare. Our results
suggest that prior to time limits, WEH enroll in welfare as soon as eligibility is established
and remain on assistance programs until their youngest children reach adulthood. Moreover,
time limits do not alter this behavior in WEH with older children. As such, being “forward
looking” in an era of time limits is not a sufficient condition for banking welfare benefits.
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In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 marked a 
dramatic change in welfare policy.  Its predecessor, Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC),  was  consistently  criticized  for  perpetuating  welfare  dependence  and  discouraging 
employment among welfare recipients.  Thus, a primary goal of PRWORA is to replace AFDC 
with  a  program  that  emphasizes  immediate  labor  force  participation  and  long-term  self-
sufficiency for welfare eligible households (WEH).  A crucial component of PRWORA’s new 
program (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF) is the imposition of a time limit 
on the number of months an individual can receive benefits.  In most cases, this limit is 60 
months.     
The imposition of time limits essentially changed how WEH perceive benefits.  Under 
AFDC, welfare benefits represented a flow of income.  However, time limits imposed by TANF 
changed this flow into a stock of wealth.  Like any other stock of wealth, it is reasonable to posit 
that WEH “bank” welfare benefits, strategically using those benefits (by moving on and off the 
welfare rolls) when they are needed the most.  For example, single mothers with school-age 
children and without adequate child care may find employment during the school-year, but go on 
welfare during the summer months.   
Several studies have postulated that forward looking WEH delay enrolling in and exit 
early  from  the  TANF  program  to  avoid  using  up  time-limited  benefits  (Grogger  and 
Michalopoulos 1999 and 2003; Kaushal and Kaestner 2001; Grogger 2003, 2004a and 2004b; 
and Swann 2005).  If one approaches econometric data with this “forward-looking conjecture” in 
mind, one can certainly interpret some econometric results as being supportive of this notion.  
For  example,  Grogger  (2003)  reports  that  families  with  young  children  use  welfare  by  6.6 
percentage points less than those with children older than 13, citing this as evidence of benefit 
banking.  However,  this  interpretation  makes  the  implicit  assumption  that  welfare  reform 
affected single mothers with young (non-school age) children in the same way as those with 
older  children.    Clearly,  this  assumption  may  or  may  not  be  the  case,  depending  on  the 
availability of adequate child care for young children during the school year.  
This assumption brings up an important issue: does the forward-looking hypothesis apply 
to all welfare eligible households?  It may be the case that individuals or households, especially 
those facing family constraints, health concerns (which increases the utility of having health 
insurance) or other factors may rationally decide not to bank benefits, or to bank welfare benefits 
in  a  manner  that  is  either  inconsistent  with,  or  not  specifically  due  to,  the  forward-looking 
hypothesis.  The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the forward-looking hypothesis is not 
a sufficient condition for welfare benefit banking.  Instead, more general considerations, which 
create what we term as a “utility gap” may be driving these decisions.        
Our results also provide some additional insight into the forward-looking conjecture.  In 
the absence of time limits, WEH enroll in welfare as soon as eligibility is established and then 
remain on until their youngest children reach adulthood.  In addition, we find that the imposition 
the 5-year time limit does not alter this behavior in WEH with children older than 13.  Instead, 
there  are  several  factors  (e.g.,  real  wage  growth,  economic  expansion,  the  EITC,  childcare 
subsidies, transitional health insurance, and temporary payroll tax waivers) that trigger delays 
and early exiting.   
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2. The Model 
 
Following  Fang  and  Silverman  (2004),  we  cast  our  model  in  the  context  of  a  theoretical 
experiment that contributes to the literature in several unique ways.  First, we recognize inertia in 
welfare and employment spells, and model benefit banking via delay (time K) and early exiting 
(time T).  Second, we allow preferences, reactions to economic conditions and policy to vary 
across welfare eligible households (WEH).  Finally, unlike Fang and Silverman, but like Grogger 
and Michalopoulos (1999), we allow the welfare eligible to work and receive welfare benefits 
simultaneously. 
Our model is centered  around a “typical” household that is eligible for welfare from 
period zero to E, enrolls in welfare at time K, and then exits at time T (E ≥ T > K ≥ 0).  Current 
period  choices  include  consumption  (c),  leisure  (l),  and  welfare  participation  (P),  which  is 
assumed to mean enrollment in a program similar to TANF or AFDC.  Following the structure 
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ρ − = ⋅ ∫ .  (1) 
 
Instantaneous utility is assumed to be   
 
  ( ) ln ( ) ( , | ) ln ( ) ( ) u t c t t P l t S t B P θ λ α µ δ = + + + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ x ,  (2) 
 
where  B  denotes  receipt  of  government  in-kind  benefits,  S  represents  the  stock  of  benefits 
remaining, and δ and µ represent welfare stigma and marginal utility of B.  λ is a function of 
employment tenure and demographics (x).  For some, λ declines faster over work spells than 
over welfare spells because self-reliance increases faster when not on welfare. The use of the 
utility shifters B, P and S were inspired by Moffit’s (1981) welfare stigma model.   
All income earned by the household is spent in the period it is earned/awarded (Stegman 
and Faris 2001, Edin and Lein 1997).  However, under TANF, benefit banking is a possible form 
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Income includes the cash grant (G) if on welfare, earnings (wh), and other income outside 
of  work  (O)  (e.g.,  food  stamps  and  childcare  subsidies).    We  assume  w  is  stochastic  and 
unknown until t.  The budget constraint is given by 
 
  ( ) (1 ) P P P P c h wh GP O D τ = + + + − ,  (5) 
 
where  τP  and  DP  are  the  net  tax  on  labor  earnings  and  out-of-pocket  daycare  expenses, 
respectively, and τ1 is at least as much as τ0 to encourage work. 
The household is faced with both time and budget constraints.  The household’s total 
allotment of time (H) can be expressed as the sum of time spent working (hP) and consuming 
leisure (lP) in period t given decision P. 
In totem, the household’s problem can be re-expressed as follows: 
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Lagrange  multipliers, ϕ  and  γ,  represent  the  utility  gained  from  the  receipt  of  a  one  period 
extension of E and m, respectively. 
As mentioned earlier, we conduct a theoretical experiment to test the effects of imposing 
time limits on behavior. In order to do so, we impose the following conditions:  
C1  B0 = 0 and B1 = 1; 
C2  δ < µ; 
C3  w is known in the present (K), while w is the expected wage in the future (T). 
Condition C1 allows us to isolate the impact of the time limit so that we do not overly complicate 
the analysis by bundling in other reforms which include, but certainly are not limited to work   4 
requirements, sanctions and work trigger limits.  C2 says welfare stigma is trumped by the piece 
of mind of having health insurance. According to C3, forward-looking households decide how 
many benefits to bank (T – K) today in period K based in part on past and present wages and 
expectations of future wages in period T and beyond. 
Our solution uses a two-step procedure.  In the first step we derive labor supply on and 
off welfare, while in step two household choices reduce to K and T.   The first part of our 
solution, assuming an interior solution, yields 
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Substituting (9) into (7) reduces the household’s decisions to K and T. The resulting indirect 
lifetime utility function given policy regime i is 
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Differentiating (10) with respect to K and T, and the multipliers yield  
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where  * * ( ) ln ( ) ( , | ) ln ( ) P P P v w c w t P l w B P θ λ µ δ ≡ + + − ⋅ x , ∆v ≡ v1(w) – v0(w), and  v ∆  denotes ∆v 
evaluated at w. Conditions (11a) and (11b) apply to both policy regimes, (11c) applies to regime 
i = 1, while (11d) applies to the other.   
 
 
3. The Behavioral Effects of Time Limits 
 
Having developed our model, we are now in a position to discuss some of the behavioral effects 
of  imposing  time  limits  on  welfare  eligible  households.    The  following  propositions  and 
corollaries provide these insights.  Please refer to the Appendix of the paper for all proofs. 
 
PROPOSITION 1.  Without time limits households enroll in welfare immediately and remain on 
welfare indefinitely. 
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COROLLARY 1 OF PROPOSITION 1.  Households facing time limit m with children older than E – 
m enroll in welfare immediately and remain on until time E. 
 
PROPOSITION 2.  Forward looking households with young children facing time limit m bank 
benefits if time-limit extensions are highly valued. 
 
With some algebraic manipulation, the proof of this proposition implies that  
 
0
m m t v ve e dt
ρ ρ α
− − ∆ ≥ ∆ +∫ . 
 
This result, which is equivalent to (1) in Grogger and Michalopoulos (1999, pp. 8), suggests that 
benefits are utilized in the present if the current-period “utility gap” - that is, the difference 
between current period utility on welfare compared to current utility off welfare - exceeds the 
expected loss in future utility.  However, this result (a) only applies to households with children 
younger  than  E  –  m,  and  (b)  is  based  on  holding  all  but  w  constant  over  time,  and  across 
individuals with the same discount rate.  The following corollaries of PROPOSITION 2 illustrate 
the importance of other factors. 
 
COROLLARY 1  OF PROPOSITION 2.  If the future expected utility gap falls, forward looking 
households do not bank benefits. 
 
COROLLARY 2 OF PROPOSITION 2. If the future expected utility gap rises relative to the current 
period gap, myopic households bank benefits. 
 
Taken in tandem, our propositions imply several key themes for the welfare literature.  
First, and most importantly, we show that time limits affect different sectors within the welfare 
eligible population differently.  Some households bank benefits, some enroll immediately and 
remain on welfare until all benefits are exhausted and (in extreme cases where the utility gap is 
zero) never go on welfare.   
Second, we show that the determining factor in welfare banking decisions is the utility 
gap, which represents the difference between current period utility on welfare and current utility 
off welfare.  Consistent with the existing literature, the utility gap will depend upon household 
discount rates and expected future wage rates.  However, it will also depend on other factors as 
well, including the age of children and the availability (and costs) of child care.  Depending on 
the  characteristics  of  the  household,  those  other  factors  may  be  the  crucial  determinants  of 
welfare banking decisions, and ultimately the success or failure of welfare programs such as 
TANF.    Thus,  the  existing  forward-looking  hypothesis  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  (and  in 
extreme cases, may not even be a necessary condition) for benefit banking to occur. 
Third,  our  model,  while  admittedly  simplistic,  implies  that  a  re-examination  of  the 
empirical welfare literature is necessary.  While empirical results themselves do not “lie”, the 
interpretation of those results are predicated upon theoretical models which we have shown may 
be inconsistent with actual decisions made by WEH.  Thus, it is important to re-examine those 
empirical results (and their implications for policy) to determine whether they are appropriate in 
light of our findings.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
There is a vast literature on time limits, most of which focuses on whether welfare recipients 
respond to the time limit by delaying enrollment in or exiting early from welfare to save benefits 
for the future.  From our model it is clear that this is one plausible explanation, but that more 
importantly, such  a decision ultimately depends upon the utility  gap which is affected by  a 
multitude of factors.  We believe that future empirical and theoretical work in this area should 
model the benefit banking decision as we have as well as incorporate, in a more comprehensive 
manner, other factors which explain the utility gap.  Once modeled in the way that we have 
described herein, the forward-looking conjecture can be more appropriately tested empirically 
and the magnitude of such an effect can more precisely be relied upon.  However, no test should 
be conducted without also testing the effects of the other various factors that influence the utility 
gap.  These tests should be conducted within the same framework so that relative comparisons 
can  be  made,  and  policy  effects  from  welfare  reform  can  more  precisely  and  correctly  be 
understood. 
It is also important to note that our model, while interesting, is extremely simple.  As 
such, it should be interpreted merely as a counter-example.  We have not shown that the forward-
looking hypothesis is unequivocally wrong.  Instead, we have shown that it might be wrong, 
especially if other factors other than those used in the forward-looking models are important to 
welfare  eligible  households.    We  have  also  shown  in  our  model  how  those  factors  distort 
decisions made under the forward-looking hypothesis.  However, future work is necessary to 
fully model welfare-to-work decisions in the presence of time limits to fully understand whether 





PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.  With i = 1 (11a) reduces to  
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also a contradiction. Thus,  * *
1 0 c c ≥ .  Now suppose  * *
0 1 h h < , which can be written as   
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Let G∝(O – D0) by some factor say ε.  If either O < D0 or ε is at least as much as the tiny 
difference between τ1 and τ0, then (12) represents a contradiction.  Hence,  * *
0 1 h h ≥ , and so ∆v is 
positive.  This means K
  * = 0 by (11a).  Since the future utility gap is positive for the same 
reasons as the current utility gap, we have ϕ
* > 0 by (11b). Together, this and (11d) imply  
E = T
*.  QED. 
 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1 OF PROPOSITION 1:  Let A denote age of youngest child.  Households 
with children older than E – m have only E – A time left on provided E is not extended (e.g., via 
childbearing). The rest of the proof follows from PROPOSITION 1. QED. 
 
PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION 2.  If the household values time limit extensions and children are 
younger than E – m, K
 * = T
 *– m by (11c).  Collapsing (11a), (11b) and (11c) yields 
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Also, K
 * = 0 when T
 * = m.   But if T
 * > m, then by (11a) we must have 
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Since ρ1m > 0,  
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The right hand side of this is equal to zero by (15).  Hence, K
 * = 0 and T
 * = m with ρ0, but with 
ρ1, K
 * > 0 and T
 * > m.  QED. 
 
PROOF  OF COROLLARY 1  OF PROPOSITION 2.  A and B are identical with the exception of 
expectations of future events.  Suppose A’s expectations of the future are given in (15) by v ∆ .  
Let B’s future expectations be different from A’s because B believes that the government at 
some point will offer in-kind benefits to those not on welfare (B0 = 1): 
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which implies  B v v ∆ > ∆ , 
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Thus, even though both are equally forward looking, A delays but B does not.  QED. 
 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2 OF PROPOSITION 2.  The proof of this follows directly from the proof 
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